Madrese-ye Nezām
| Madrese-ye Nezām | ||
| ||
| Founded | 1708 AN | |
| Sepahbod | Arshad Shahukar | |
| Part of | General Inspectorate of Eura and Corum | |
| Manpower |
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| Garrison | Raspur | |
The Madrese-ye Nezām (established in 1708 AN) is the military academy of the allied Ground Forces of Constancia, the Suren Confederacy and Zeed, located in Raspur. Cadets of the academy achieve the equivalent second lieutenant in their respective militaries rank upon graduation and join the Ground Forces. The institution is subordinate to the General Inspectorate of Eura and Corum.
The Madrese-ye Nezām also cooperates closely with the House of the Learned to provide a General Staff Officer Course dedicated to doctoral-level work on military doctrine, applied defence sciences and management. The institution will also maintain mutual accreditation with the Peace Academy of Hurmu.
Administration
The commanding officer at the Madrese-ye Nezām is the Superintendent, equivalent to the president or chancellor of a civilian university. The inaugural holder of the position, appointed in 1708 AN was the Sepahbod (Lieutenant-General) Arshad Shahukar, an officer of Babkhan-heritage in service of the Imperial Constancian Armed Forces. The Commandant of Cadets, equivalent to a dean of students at the civilian level, appointed in the same year was the Taxiarchos (Brigadier) Nicholaus Veyou.
There are twelve academic departments at the Madrese-ye Nezām, each with a Sarhang (Colonel) as the head of department. These tenured sarhangs, quickly nicknamed the sleeping apostles by the irreverent student body, comprised the core of the Academic Board under the supervision of a Provost, the Taxiarchos (Brigadier) Yorgos Papiades.
Syllabus
Module: Lessons from the Third Euran War
The Third Euran War was a conflict between Zeed and the Raspur Pact, fought in the southern and central regions of Euran between 17.II.1693 AN and 24.IX.1701 AN.
Strategic Lessons
- The Challenge of Fighting Proxy Wars
- The conflict against Zeed involved battling numerous proxy forces and militias rather than a conventional military
- This presented challenges in identifying the true enemy, combating guerrilla tactics, and undermining sources of recruitment and support
- The Limits of Deterrence
- Economic sanctions and blockades failed to deter Zeed's aggression
- Military posturing and displays of force were insufficient to change the revolutionary regime's behavior
- Force Projection Capabilities
- Maintaining an ability to project power globally was crucial, as exemplified by Zeed's ability to supply rebel forces in distant Benacia
- This requires robust maritime forces, air transport, and forward basing options
Operational Lessons
- Joint Operations
- The massive amphibious invasion of Avey highlighted the necessity of seamless joint operations between different military branches
- Streamlined command structures and integrated planning processes are vital for complex operations
- Logistics and Sustainment
- The lack of infrastructure on Altus islands hampered efforts to establish a viable launching point for the invasion
- Comprehensive logistics planning for transportation, maintenance, fuel, and supplies is essential for expeditionary campaigns
- Intelligence Gathering
- Lack of accurate maps, reconnaissance, and intelligence analyses hindered operational planning and execution
- Investment in intelligence assets, particularly satellites and human intelligence networks, is critical
Tactical Lessons
- Counter-Insurgency Doctrine
- Combating the guerrilla tactics and irregular forces employed by enemy militias proved enormously challenging
- New counter-insurgency doctrines encompassing military, political, economic and civil dimensions are needed
- Force Protection
- Zeed's employment of improvised explosive devices caused significant casualties during amphibious operations
- Enhanced force protection measures, tactical discipline, and counter-IED training must be prioritised
- Interoperability of Equipment
- Incompatibilities between allied equipment, such as aircraft and munitions, hampered combat effectiveness
- Standardisation and interoperability requirements should drive future procurement decisions
Capability Development
- Air Superiority
- The lack of a modern air force and limited suppression of enemy air defences hindered air operations
- Investments in air superiority fighters, electronic warfare, and assault support aviation are vital
- Precision Strike
- Lack of precision guided munitions led to indiscriminate bombing and missed targets
- Developing a robust precision strike capability through modern munitions and targeting systems is crucial
- Special Operations Forces
- The importance of special operations units in operating with proxy forces and behind enemy lines was demonstrated
- Increasing funding and training for elite special reconnaissance and counter-terror units is recommended
This module reflects the harsh lessons imposed by the challenges of the Third Euran War. By studying and institutionalising these lessons, allied forces can enhance their readiness for future conflicts against asymmetric and proxy threats.
