Clean Government and Elections Act, 1760

Clean Government and Elections Act, 1760

14th Cortes Federales
Long title	An Act to make the audit of public money independent of the Government by placing the Federal Audit Office under the Cortes Federales; to give the Committee of Ethics in Government an independent footing and the power to compel documents and testimony; to regulate party and campaign finance by extending the existing regime to political action committees and to a year-round register of party accounts and large donations, and by tracing the sources of political money and limiting anonymous and pass-through donations; to restrict the movement of former ministers into paid influence; to open the award of public money and the declarations of office-holders to public inspection as open data; to secure the integrity of the count by a risk-limiting audit of federal elections; to provide for the coordination of the integrity institutions of the Federation; among other purposes.
Introduced by	Council of State (Government of the Federal Accord), sponsored by Tomás Iñiguez (CGA / North Lyrica) and Francisco Gabaza (FCP / Santander)
Extent	Entire Federation of Nouvelle Alexandrie
Dates
Royal Assent	20.X.1760 AN
Commencement	20.X.1760 AN
Other legislation
Amendments	None
Related legislation	Comprehensive Anti-Corruption Act, 1721 Federal Audit Office Establishment and Function Act, 1737 Anti-Corruption Agency (Mandate and Resources) Act, 1756 Federal Campaign Finance Act, 1686 Campaign Finance Transparency Act, 1741 Government Code of Conduct Federal Accord coalition agreement, 1759

The Clean Government and Elections Act, 1760 (Alexandrian: Loi sur le gouvernement intègre et les élections, 1760; Martino: Ley de Gobierno Limpio y Elecciones, 1760) is a law of Nouvelle Alexandrie, passed by the 14th Cortes Federales on the proposal of the Council of State of the Federal Accord and given Royal Assent on 20.X.1760 AN. It does three things. First, it takes the Federal Audit Office out of the Department of the Treasury and places it under the Cortes Federales, so that the audit of public money no longer answers to the government it audits. Second, it gives the Committee of Ethics in Government, the body that already holds the Ministerial Code of Conduct under the Government Code of Conduct, an independent statutory footing and the power to compel documents and testimony. Third, it brings one standard to public and to political money and secures the integrity of the vote: it extends the regulation of party and campaign finance to the political action committees the existing law leaves aside, opens a register of party accounts and large donations the year round, holds former ministers back from paid influence for two years, and adds a risk-limiting audit of the count to the certification of every federal election. It also opens the award of public money and the declarations of office-holders to public inspection as open data.

The Act creates no new agency. It carries out the clean-government undertakings of the Federal Accord coalition agreement, 1759 by strengthening the institutions the Federation already has: an audit of public money independent of the government, a ministerial integrity office able to compel documents and testimony, and the party-finance reform its predecessors failed to carry. The audit is re-seated and the ethics office strengthened, and the regulation of political money is extended through the Federal Elections Commission and the Office of Political Finance Oversight that already hold it. Corruption as a crime remains with the Ombudsman and the Anti-Corruption Agency under the Comprehensive Anti-Corruption Act, 1721, to which the Act routes referrals rather than adding a competing body.

Background

The Federation's integrity institutions were built in layers. The Comprehensive Anti-Corruption Act, 1721 created the Anti-Corruption Agency under the Ombudsman, with power to compel testimony and to prosecute, and required every public official to disclose meetings, funding decisions, spending, and personal finances. The Federal Audit Office Establishment and Function Act, 1737 created the Federal Audit Office as the supreme audit institution, but placed it under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Treasury: the Auditor-General is nominated by the Secretary of the Treasury, reports to the Secretary, and needs the Secretary's approval to make regulations or add a bureau. The conduct of ministers is governed by the Ministerial Code of Conduct, a regulation of the Presidential Office held by the Committee of Ethics in Government, whose sanctions run from a public apology to a call for resignation.

Two attempts to go further failed, both pressed by the Civic Governance Alliance under its leader Elena Svensson. The Alliance's Clean Government Act, 1750, drafted after the Pact of Shadows scandal, was stalled for four years as the price of the governing coalition and never reached a vote; its successor, the Clean Government and Political Reform Act, 1754, brought again in the chamber by the Alliance's parliamentary leader Tomás Iñiguez, was defeated in the Federal Assembly by 260 votes to 438 in 1755 AN, the government's case resting on the Ombudsman's testimony that a separate anti-corruption commission would duplicate the work of the Anti-Corruption Agency. Premier Montero had pledged that the government would carry the party-finance and integrity reforms in a measure of its own; the Anti-Corruption Agency (Mandate and Resources) Act, 1756 that followed enlarged the Agency's powers and budget by 712 votes to 14 but dropped those reforms, leaving the government's own conduct and the independence of the audit untouched, and Svensson carried the party-finance question to the country as an issue of the 1759 general election.

After the election the Federal Elections Commission's returns traced NAX€612 million of political action committee (PAC) spending only to the committees that had bought the advertising or organized the canvassing, not to the contributors behind them. Svensson said the Alliance would seek original-source tracing for PAC money and year-round public accounts for parties in the next Cortes.

The Federal Accord coalition agreement, 1759 made these promises: that the audit of public money would be independent of the government, that the ministerial integrity office would be able to compel documents and testimony, and that party finance would be reformed, with the Federal Consensus Party and the Civic Governance Alliance to bring them forward in the first session. The Alliance had returned ninety-five members at the 1759 AN election and entered the Government of the Federal Accord with the Vice-Presidency and the Treasury, the standing on which it pressed the reform into the coalition's program. This Act is that measure. It answers the duplication objection that beat the earlier bills by creating nothing new: it re-seats one existing office, strengthens another, and extends the regulation of political money that the Federal Campaign Finance Act, 1686 and the Campaign Finance Transparency Act, 1741 already place in the hands of the Federal Elections Commission and the Office of Political Finance Oversight. In this it follows the Alliance's own doctrine of reform, the Resplandorista principle of Allinta Ruray, that good people in badly designed institutions still produce corrupt outcomes, so that the answer is to redesign the institution rather than to raise another body. The party-finance reform has been the Civic Governance Alliance's aim across two earlier bills, one standard for public and for political money; defeated with the Act of 1754, it is carried here on the Federal Accord's majority, holding to the same discipline as the rest of the Act by extending the bodies the Federation already has.

Key provisions

The Act has three operative parts. Part II moves the Federal Audit Office from the Department of the Treasury to the Cortes Federales. The Auditor-General keeps the six-year non-renewable term and the majority confirmation of the Act of 1737, but is nominated by the Speaker on the recommendation of the Assembly's Committee on Appointments rather than by the Secretary of the Treasury, may be removed only by a two-thirds vote for incapacity or serious misconduct, and reports to the Cortes alone. The Office's budget is charged on the Consolidated Fund as a distinct estimate, and its audit may follow public money into the hands of anyone who receives it. The Government must answer each report before the Cortes within sixty days, and the Auditor-General keeps a public register of every recommendation and whether it was carried out. The Auditor-General also publishes the federal contracts and grants as open, machine-readable data, extending the electronic procurement system of the Government Procurement Act, 1720, so that the award of public money may be followed by any person. Audit judges each decision on what was known at the time, creates no personal liability by itself, and follows public money only above thresholds the Auditor-General sets. Everything else in that Act, the bureaus, the audit duties, the unrestricted access to records, stands unchanged.

Part III continues the Committee of Ethics in Government as an independent statutory office, outside the Presidential Office, headed by a Commissioner appointed for a single six-year term on a three-fifths vote of the Federal Assembly. The Ministerial Code of Conduct is given the force of law and binds ministers and their political staff. The Committee may compel the production of documents and the attendance of witnesses under oath, and a claim of confidentiality within the Government is no ground to refuse. Private correspondence and matters of private life may be reached only by order of a court, as Articles 24 and 25 of the Proclamation of Punta Santiago require. The Committee finds and reports; it does not remove anyone. Its recommendations go to the Premier and are laid before the Cortes, matters that may be criminal go to the Ombudsman, and where the Ombudsman is already investigating the same facts the Committee stands aside. Office-holders may ask the Committee for confidential advice in advance and are protected if they follow it, and frivolous or political complaints are dismissed with reasons. An examination is opened within thirty days and reported within six months, and a stalled three-fifths vote falls back to an absolute majority after sixty days. The declarations of income, assets, and interests that office-holders already make under the law are published as open data, and the Committee keeps the register of them for the office-holders within its charge.

Part IV brings one standard to public and to political money. It extends the regulation of party and campaign finance that the Federal Campaign Finance Act, 1686 and the Campaign Finance Transparency Act, 1741 already place in the Federal Elections Commission and the Office of Political Finance Oversight to the political action committees the existing regime does not reach. It opens a public register of party accounts and of large donations that stays open the year round, with large gifts disclosed the day they are received; it requires every donation to be traced to its true source and forbids donations made anonymously or through a conduit; and it applies the existing ban on company and union treasury money so that it cannot be routed around. It puts the Office of Political Finance Oversight on a statutory footing to enforce these rules, with civil penalties, the referral of crime to the Ombudsman, and the lawfulness of a party itself left to the High Court under Article 7 of the Proclamation of Punta Santiago. And it holds a former member of the Council of State back for two years from taking paid work to influence the Federation on a matter that person handled in office. It secures the integrity of the vote by adding to the Commission's certification of a federal election a risk-limiting audit of the count, a check of a sample of the ballots against the recorded count sufficient to confirm the outcome, with an enlarged audit or a recount where it does not. The Part keeps the existing contribution limits and creates no new agency.

Part V requires the Ombudsman, the Auditor-General, the Commissioner, the Director of the Office of Political Finance Oversight, and the Cortes committee on Democratic Quality, Anti-Corruption, and Institutional and Legal Reform to share information and refer matters to one another, so that the bodies act as one system. The committee is chaired by an opposition Deputy, the offices are themselves audited each year, and the Act is reviewed every five years.

Relationship to existing bodies

Body	Established	What it does now	What this Act changes
Ombudsman and Anti-Corruption Agency	Comprehensive Anti-Corruption Act, 1721; enlarged by the Anti-Corruption Agency (Mandate and Resources) Act, 1756	Investigates and prosecutes corruption; compels testimony; runs the disclosure platform and the whistleblower system	Nothing. Receives referrals from the Audit Office and the Committee; disclosures to either are protected under the Act of 1721.
Federal Audit Office	Federal Audit Office Establishment and Function Act, 1737	Audits federal entities from within the Department of the Treasury	Re-seated under the Cortes Federales; Treasury nomination, direction, and approval removed; tenure secured; budget on the Consolidated Fund; publishes federal contracts and grants as open data.
Committee of Ethics in Government	Government Code of Conduct (Presidential Office regulations)	Holds the Ministerial Code; investigates self-reported breaches; recommends apology, loss of responsibilities, or resignation	Made an independent statutory office with a Commissioner; given power to compel documents and testimony; reports laid before the Cortes; publishes office-holders' declarations of interests and assets as open data.
Federal Elections Commission and the Office of Political Finance Oversight	Federal Campaign Finance Act, 1686; Campaign Finance Transparency Act, 1741	Register parties, candidates, and donations; run the National Campaign Finance Database; enforce the contribution limits and the disclosure rules	Their regime extended to political action committees and to a year-round register; source-tracing and anti-conduit rules added; the Office of Political Finance Oversight given a statutory footing, compel powers, and civil penalties, referring crime to the Ombudsman; a risk-limiting audit of the count added to the certification of federal elections.
Cortes committees on Democratic Quality, Anti-Corruption, and Institutional and Legal Reform, on Appointments, and on Budget and Finances	Standing committees, 1706 AN	Parliamentary scrutiny, nominations, and the estimates	Receive every report under the Act; hear and recommend the Auditor-General and the Commissioner; lay the two offices' estimates.

Legislative progress

The Council of State introduced the bill on 19.II.1760 AN, with the Treasury Secretary Tomás Iñiguez and the Federal Consensus Party leader Francisco Gabaza as its sponsors. The Federal Assembly carried it on the final division of 7.X.1760 AN by 473 votes to 298, with 30 abstentions; the Chamber of Peers concurred on 17.X.1760 AN by 55 to 53, with 10 abstentions; and King Sinchi Roca II granted Royal Assent on 20.X.1760 AN.

Legislative progress

Stage	Date	Chamber	Action	Votes (Y-N-A)	Details
1	19.II.1760 AN	Federal Assembly	Introduction	-	Introduced for the Council of State by Tomás Iñiguez (CGA) and Francisco Gabaza (FCP)
2	-	Federal Assembly	Committee report	-	Committee on Democratic Quality, Anti-Corruption, and Institutional and Legal Reform
3	7.X.1760 AN	Federal Assembly	Final division	473-298-30	Passed; sent to the Chamber of Peers
4	17.X.1760 AN	Chamber of Peers	Concurrence	55-53-10	Concurred without amendment
5	20.X.1760 AN	-	Royal Assent	-	Signed into law by King Sinchi Roca II

Bill as submitted to the Hopper of the Federal Assembly, 1760 AN

Clean Government and Elections Act, 1760

THE READING OF
A
BILL
TO
make the audit of public money independent of the Government by placing the Federal Audit Office under the Cortes Federales; to give the Committee of Ethics in Government an independent footing and the power to compel documents and testimony; to regulate party and campaign finance by extending the existing regime to political action committees and to a year-round register of party accounts and large donations, tracing the sources of political money and limiting anonymous and pass-through donations; to restrict the movement of former ministers into paid influence; to open the award of public money and the declarations of office-holders to public inspection as open data; to secure the integrity of the count by a risk-limiting audit of federal elections; to provide for the coordination of the integrity institutions of the Federation; among other purposes.

Clean Government and Elections Act, 1760

Presented for the Council of State by Tomás Iñiguez (CGA) and Francisco Gabaza (FCP)
Ordered, by the Cortes Federales of Nouvelle Alexandrie,
to be Printed, 1760 AN.

BE IT ENACTED by the King's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Cortes Federales, in this present session assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:-

PART I
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS

Article 1: Citation.

1. This Act may be cited as the "Clean Government and Elections Act, 1760".

Article 2: Purpose.

1. The purposes of this Act are to make the audit of public money independent of the Government, to give the office that holds ministers to their code of conduct the independence and the powers to do so, and to bring one standard to public and to political money by extending the regulation of party and campaign finance.
2. This Act establishes no new agency. It builds on the Comprehensive Anti-Corruption Act, 1721, the Federal Audit Office Establishment and Function Act, 1737, the Federal Campaign Finance Act, 1686, the Campaign Finance Transparency Act, 1741, and the Government Code of Conduct, and is read together with them. Where this Act is silent, those instruments continue to apply as before.

Article 3: Definitions.

1. In this Act:
   1. "the Anti-Corruption Act" means the Comprehensive Anti-Corruption Act, 1721, as amended;
   2. "the Audit Office Act" means the Federal Audit Office Establishment and Function Act, 1737;
   3. "the Audit Office" means the Federal Audit Office, and "the Auditor-General" means its head;
   4. "the Committee" means the Committee of Ethics in Government continued under Article 8, and "the Commissioner" means its chair;
   5. "the Code" means the Ministerial Code of Conduct forming part of the Government Code of Conduct;
   6. "the responsible Committee" means the Committee of the Federal Assembly on Democratic Quality, Anti-Corruption, and Institutional and Legal Reform;
   7. "public money" means money raised, held, or spent by or on behalf of the Federation, a federal public body, or a public enterprise in which the Federation holds an interest, and includes grants and contracts paid from that money and every fund established by federal law; money that the Federation transfers to a Region is public money until the Region receives it;
   8. "office-holder" means the President of the Government, every member of the Council of State, and the members of their private offices and political staff.

PART II
THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE AUDIT OF PUBLIC MONEY

Article 4: The Audit Office as an office of the Cortes Federales.

1. The Audit Office is continued as an office of the Cortes Federales, independent of the Council of State, and ceases to be under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Treasury. Its staff, records, property, and current appropriation pass with it.
2. The Audit Office Act is read with the following substitutions, and with no other change:
   1. the nomination of the Auditor-General under Article 5 of that Act is made by the Speaker of the Federal Assembly on the recommendation of the Committee on Appointments, after the responsible Committee has heard the candidate in public;
   2. regulations, and additional bureaus or departments, under Article 3 of that Act are made by the Auditor-General without the approval of any Secretary, are laid before the Committee on Budget and Finances, and take effect thirty days after being laid unless that Committee resolves against them;
   3. every report, finding, and communication that Articles 3, 4, and 5 of that Act direct to the Secretary of the Treasury is made to the Cortes Federales alone, and a special audit under Article 4 of that Act may be requested by the Cortes Federales, by either chamber, or by a committee of either chamber.
3. The Audit Office continues to coordinate with the Federal Bank of Nouvelle Alexandrie, the Federal Revenue Authority, and the Office of Management and Budget as Article 3 of the Audit Office Act provides, but no such body, and no member of the Council of State, may direct the Audit Office in the choice, conduct, or reporting of an audit. The Government may ask the Audit Office to examine a matter; the Auditor-General decides whether to do so.

Article 5: Tenure of the Auditor-General.

1. The Auditor-General holds office for the single non-renewable term of six years fixed by the Audit Office Act, and is confirmed by the Federal Assembly as that Act provides.
2. The Auditor-General may be removed before the end of that term only on a resolution of the Federal Assembly carried by not fewer than two-thirds of the votes cast, and only on the ground of incapacity or serious misconduct established before the responsible Committee.
3. The Auditor-General in office at the commencement of this Act continues in office for the remainder of that term.
4. An Auditor-General whose term has ended continues in office until a successor is confirmed, for not longer than one year.

Article 6: Money.

1. The expenses of the Audit Office are charged on the Consolidated Fund and voted by the Cortes Federales as a distinct estimate, prepared by the Auditor-General and laid by the Committee on Budget and Finances.
2. The estimate must not be reduced below that of the preceding year except by resolution of the Federal Assembly.

Article 7: Reach and publication.

1. The Audit Office may audit any account into which public money passes, and may follow public money into the hands of any person or body that receives it, to the extent of the public money received.
2. The access to records, documents, and personnel that the Audit Office Act gives the Audit Office extends to every recipient of public money, and no claim of confidentiality within the Government may be set up against it.
3. Every report of the Audit Office is laid before the Cortes Federales and published, save for such particulars as a court certifies must be withheld for national security.
4. The Government must answer a report of the Audit Office before the Cortes Federales within sixty days of its publication, stating what it has done and will do in response to each finding.
5. In judging whether public money has been well spent, the Audit Office judges each decision on the information available to the person who made it at the time it was made. A finding of the Audit Office does not of itself create any personal liability. The Auditor-General must set by regulation the thresholds below which the Audit Office does not follow public money into the hands of a recipient, and the access given by paragraph 2 is exercised in proportion to the public money at stake.
6. The Auditor-General keeps a public register of the recommendations of the Audit Office, recording against each the Government's answer under paragraph 4 and whether it has been carried out, and reports on the register each year. The responsible Committee must hold hearings on such reports of the Audit Office as it selects, to which it may summon the responsible office-holders and officials.
7. The Auditor-General must publish, in an open and machine-readable form, a register of the contracts and grants paid from public money above a threshold the Auditor-General sets, and a public authority must record its contracts and grants to that register. The register extends the electronic procurement system of the Government Procurement Act, 1720, and any person may follow the award of public money through it.

PART III
THE MINISTERIAL INTEGRITY OFFICE

Article 8: The Committee of Ethics in Government.

1. The Committee of Ethics in Government, which holds the Code, is continued as an independent statutory office and is the ministerial integrity office of the Federation. It ceases to form part of the Presidential Office, and no member of the Council of State may direct it.
2. The Committee consists of a Commissioner for Ethics in Government, who chairs it, and two members. Each is appointed by H.M. the King on a resolution of the Federal Assembly carried by not fewer than three-fifths of the votes cast, moved on the recommendation of the Committee on Appointments after the responsible Committee has heard the candidate in public, for a single non-renewable term of six years.
3. Where a resolution under paragraph 2 has not been carried within sixty days of the nomination being laid, the Federal Assembly may on a further ballot appoint the nominee, or another nominee recommended in the same way, by an absolute majority of its members. A Commissioner or member whose term has ended continues in office until a successor is appointed, for not longer than one year.
4. A person who has held office as a member of the Council of State, a Deputy, or a Peer within the preceding five years must not be appointed, and the Commissioner and members must not engage in partisan political activity during their term, except to vote.
5. The Commissioner or a member may be removed before the end of the term only on a resolution of the Federal Assembly carried by not fewer than two-thirds of the votes cast, and only on the ground of incapacity or serious misconduct established before the responsible Committee.
6. The expenses of the Committee are charged on the Consolidated Fund and voted as a distinct estimate, which must not be reduced below that of the preceding year except by resolution of the Federal Assembly.
7. The persons serving on the Committee at the commencement of this Act continue to serve until the first appointments under this Article are made, which must be within one year of commencement.

Article 9: The Code and the Committee's jurisdiction.

1. The Code has the force of law and binds every office-holder. The Committee, or the President of the Government, may propose an amendment to the Code, which takes effect when approved by resolution of the Federal Assembly. The Executive Appointments Standards and the Lobbyist and Consultants Registrar Regulations are not affected by this Act.
2. The Committee may examine whether an office-holder has acted in breach of the Code, on a complaint from any person, on a reference from either chamber of the Cortes Federales or from the responsible Committee, or on its own motion.
3. The Committee does not try or punish crime. Where it finds that a matter may constitute an offense, it must refer the matter to the Ombudsman under the Anti-Corruption Act. Where the Ombudsman or the Anti-Corruption Agency is investigating the same facts, the Committee must suspend its examination unless the Ombudsman agrees that it continue.
4. An office-holder may ask the Committee for a confidential opinion on whether proposed conduct would comply with the Code. An opinion is not binding, but an office-holder who follows an opinion in good faith, having disclosed the material facts, does not breach the Code in doing so. The Committee publishes anonymized summaries of its opinions.
5. The Committee must dismiss, with reasons given to the complainant, a complaint that is frivolous, vexatious, made for a political purpose, plainly unsupported, or outside its jurisdiction, and must not make a complaint public before it decides to open an examination on it.
6. The Committee decides within thirty days of receiving a complaint or reference whether to open an examination, and delivers its final report within six months of opening it. It may extend that period, and must publish the fact and the reasons of any extension.
7. The declarations of income, assets, liabilities, and interests that office-holders make under Article 3 of the Anti-Corruption Act are published in an open and machine-readable form. The Committee maintains and publishes the register of those declarations for the office-holders within its jurisdiction, and an office-holder must lodge the declaration and keep it current.

Article 10: Power to compel documents and testimony.

1. For the purposes of an examination, the Commissioner may by written notice require any person:
   1. to produce any document or record in that person's possession or control that relates to the exercise of public office; and
   2. to attend before the Committee and answer, on oath or affirmation, the questions the Committee puts.
2. A claim of confidentiality within the Government, of collective responsibility, or of the confidence of the Council of State is not a ground to refuse a notice under this Article. A document the Government claims touches national security is examined by the Committee in closed session; the claim is not a ground to withhold it.
3. A notice under this Article does not reach the private life or private correspondence of any person. Where the Committee has reason to believe that a private record is necessary to its examination, it may apply to the High Court of Justice for an order under Articles 24 and 25 of the Proclamation of Punta Santiago, and may obtain that record only by such an order.
4. Legal professional privilege and the privilege against self-incrimination are preserved, save that an answer given under compulsion under this Article must not be used against the person who gave it in any criminal proceeding other than a proceeding for a false statement made to the Committee.
5. A person who, without lawful excuse, fails to comply with a notice under this Article, or who destroys, conceals, or falsifies a document required by it, or who knowingly makes a false statement to the Committee, commits an offense. The Commissioner may certify the failure to the High Court of Justice, which may deal with it as a contempt of the Court; where the person is a Deputy or a Peer, the Commissioner certifies the failure instead to the chamber of which that person is a member, which deals with it as a breach of its privileges.

Article 11: Findings and their consequences.

1. The Committee must report its findings in writing, and must give any person criticized a fair opportunity to answer before the report is made final.
2. Every final report is delivered to the President of the Government, laid before the Cortes Federales and the responsible Committee, and published, save for particulars a court certifies must be withheld for national security.
3. Where the Committee finds a breach of the Code, it may recommend any measure the Code provides, including a public apology, the loss of particular responsibilities, or resignation from office. The President of the Government must state to the Federal Assembly, within thirty days, what action has been taken on each recommendation and, where a recommendation is not followed, the reasons.
4. Where a finding concerns the President of the Government, the report is delivered to the Speaker of the Federal Assembly, and the Assembly must have the opportunity to debate it.
5. A finding of the Committee is not a verdict of a court and does not of itself remove any person from office. The removal of an office-holder remains a matter for the President of the Government, the Crown, and the Cortes Federales under the Proclamation of Punta Santiago.

Article 12: Protected disclosures.

1. A disclosure made in good faith to the Committee, to the Audit Office, or to the responsible Committee, of information tending to show that public money has been misused or that an office-holder has breached the Code, is a disclosure protected under Article 5 of the Anti-Corruption Act, and the protections and remedies of that Article apply to it.

PART IV
PARTY AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE, AND ELECTION INTEGRITY

Article 13: One standard for public and political money.

1. This Part extends the regulation of party and campaign finance that the Federal Campaign Finance Act, 1686 and the Campaign Finance Transparency Act, 1741 established, administered by the Federal Elections Commission and the Office of Political Finance Oversight, and establishes no new agency for the purpose.
2. In this Part: "the Commission" means the Federal Elections Commission; "the Office" means the Office of Political Finance Oversight continued under Article 17; "a political committee" means a political party, a candidate committee, or a political action committee; "a political action committee" means an association, other than a party or a candidate committee, that raises or spends money to influence a federal election; "a large donation" means a donation above the threshold the Commission sets for the register; and this Part applies to federal elections, the finance of elections to non-federal office remaining a matter for the law of the Region.

Article 14: The year-round register of party accounts and large donations.

1. The Commission must keep a public register, open the year round, of the accounts of every political party and of every large donation to a political committee, recording the amount, the date, and the true source of the donation.
2. A large donation must be reported to the register within one (1) day of its receipt; and every political committee must render a full account of its receipts and its spending each quarter.
3. The register is kept and published by the Commission through the National Campaign Finance Database, advanced with the administrative modernization and the National Connectivity Initiative that Article 24 of the budget supports, and the Office monitors compliance with it.

Article 15: Political action committees brought under the Commission.

1. A political action committee is regulated by the Commission on the same footing as a political party and a candidate committee. It must register with the Commission, keep to the contribution limits the law sets, and disclose its receipts and its spending to the register under Article 14.
2. The prohibition on a contribution from the treasury of a company or a labor organization applies to a political action committee, and must not be evaded by a gift routed through a committee, an association, or any other person.
3. This Article does not alter the contribution limits in force under the Campaign Finance Transparency Act, 1741; it extends the existing rules to the committees they had not reached.

Article 16: Source-tracing, and anonymous and pass-through donations.

1. A political committee must trace every donation above the reporting threshold to the person who is its original source, and must record and report that source; a donation whose source cannot be established must not be kept.
2. A person must not make a donation in the name of another, or through another as a conduit; a donation given anonymously above the threshold the Commission sets is prohibited and must be surrendered to the Consolidated Fund.
3. A large gift must be disclosed to the register on the day it is received.

Article 17: The Office of Political Finance Oversight.

1. The Office of Political Finance Oversight, established by the Campaign Finance Transparency Act, 1741 to monitor compliance and to investigate breaches of the law of party and campaign finance, is continued and placed on the footing of this Article, within the Commission and independent of the Government in the conduct of its investigations.
2. The Office is headed by a Director appointed by the Speaker of the Federal Assembly on the recommendation of the Committee on Appointments, for a single non-renewable term of six (6) years, removable only by a two-thirds vote of the Federal Assembly for incapacity or serious misconduct; and its expenses are charged on the Consolidated Fund as a distinct estimate.
3. For an investigation the Office may require the production of documents and the attendance of witnesses on the terms on which the Committee may under Article 10, and the protections and limits of that Article, including the reach of private life only by order of the High Court of Justice, apply.
4. The Office may impose the civil penalties the law provides for a breach of the rules of party and campaign finance. Where it finds that a matter may constitute an offense, it refers the matter to the Ombudsman under the Anti-Corruption Act; and where the lawfulness of a party itself is in question, the matter is for the High Court of Justice under Article 7 of the Proclamation of Punta Santiago, the Office disbanding no party itself.

Article 18: The revolving door.

1. A person who has held office as a member of the Council of State must not, for two (2) years after leaving office, be engaged for reward to influence the Federation on a matter in which that person was concerned while in office, whether as a lobbyist, an adviser, or an employee.
2. The Committee of Ethics in Government keeps a public register of the employment taken up by former office-holders within that period, advises on the application of this Article, and reports a breach to the Cortes; a breach of this Article by an office-holder is a breach of the Code under Part III.

Article 19: Integrity of the count and the audit of elections.

1. Before it certifies the result of a federal election, the Commission must carry out a risk-limiting audit of the count, being a check of a sample of the ballots against the recorded count large enough to confirm the outcome to a high level of confidence the Commission sets, and must publish the method and the result of the audit.
2. Where the audit does not confirm the recorded outcome, the Commission must enlarge the audit and, where the outcome remains unconfirmed, order a recount as the law provides before the result is certified.
3. The audit is conducted in the presence of the party and independent observers who attend the count, and does not displace the certification of the chief electoral officer or the final review of the Commission, but forms part of them.

PART V
COORDINATION AND CLOSING PROVISIONS

Article 20: Coordination of the integrity institutions.

1. The Ombudsman, the Auditor-General, the Commissioner, the Director of the Office, and the chair of the responsible Committee must meet not less than twice in each year to coordinate their work.
2. Each of the Ombudsman, the Audit Office, the Committee, and the Office must refer to the proper one of the others any matter that falls within that body's functions, the Audit Office referring to the Ombudsman any finding that public money may have been misused, the Ombudsman referring to the Committee any conduct of an office-holder that is not an offense but may breach the Code, and the Office referring to the Ombudsman any breach of the law of party and campaign finance that may be an offense; and each may share with the others any information it holds, subject to any order of a court.
3. Nothing in this Act diminishes the functions or the powers of the Ombudsman or the Anti-Corruption Agency under the Anti-Corruption Act, or of the courts.
4. The responsible Committee receives the reports of the Ombudsman, the Audit Office, the Committee, and the Office, may take evidence on any of them, and must report to the Federal Assembly each year on the state of public integrity in the Federation.
5. The responsible Committee is chaired by a Deputy who does not belong to a party represented in the Council of State.

Article 21: Relation to existing law.

1. The Audit Office Act, the Government Code of Conduct, the Federal Campaign Finance Act, 1686, and the Campaign Finance Transparency Act, 1741 have effect subject to this Act. Where this Act and an earlier enactment on the same matter cannot stand together, this Act prevails to the extent of the inconsistency.
2. The Auditor-General, the Commissioner, and the Director of the Office may each make regulations for the purposes of this Act in relation to their own office, which are laid before the responsible Committee and take effect thirty days after being laid unless that Committee resolves against them.
3. The accounts of the Audit Office, of the Committee, and of the Office are audited each year by an independent auditor appointed by the Committee on Budget and Finances, whose report is laid before the Cortes Federales.
4. Five years after the commencement of this Act, and every five years thereafter, the responsible Committee must review the operation of this Act, taking evidence from the Ombudsman, the Auditor-General, the Commissioner, and the Director of the Office, and must lay its report before the Cortes Federales with any recommendation for amendment.

Article 22: Commencement and application.

1. This Act extends to the whole of the Federation of Nouvelle Alexandrie.
2. This Act does not come into force until it has received the Royal Assent of H.M. King Sinchi Roca II, and must be published in the Federal Gazette within seven days of the Assent.
3. The year-round register under Article 14 and the regulation of political action committees under Article 15 take effect on a day the Commission appoints, not later than one year after the Royal Assent; the remaining provisions take effect on the Assent.
4. If any provision of this Act is held invalid or unenforceable, that provision alone, and not the whole Act, is inoperative.

Amendments

No amendments to date.

Voting record

Under the Federal Accord coalition agreement, 1759 the three governing parties, together holding 448 of the 801 seats, were committed to the Government's legislative program, of which this Act was a part. On the final division of 7.X.1760 AN the Federal Assembly carried the bill by 473 votes to 298, with 30 abstentions.

Federal Assembly final reading (7.X.1760 AN)

Notable votes on the Clean Government and Elections Act, 1760 AN

Deputy	Region	Party	Vote	Role/Notes
Tomás Iñiguez	North Lyrica	CGA		Treasury Secretary; co-sponsor of the bill
Francisco Gabaza	Santander	FCP		Leader of the Federal Consensus Party; co-sponsor of the bill
Cao Qiang	Alduria	FCP		Special Counselor to the Council of State
Elena Svensson	North Lyrica	CGA		Vice-Premier; Coordinator of the Civic Governance Alliance
Marcos Ferreira Gonçalves	Santander	DSP		Premier
Pierre-Antoine Blaise	Valencia	DSP		Deputy since 1749 AN
José Manuel Montero	Wechua Nation	FHP		Leader of the Opposition; the Federal Humanists opposed the bill
Fred Strong	North Lyrica	FHP		Former Vice-Premier and Secretary of Defense
Sumaili Humahuaca	Wechua Nation	FHP		Former Secretary of Justice
Piti Gándara	Alduria	Independent		Led the independents backing the Government

Vote summary by party

Federal Assembly final reading, 7.X.1760 AN

Political party	Yes	No	Abstain/absent	Total	% Support
Democratic Socialist Party	232	0	0	232	100%
Wakara People's Party	28	0	0	28	100%
Civic Governance Alliance	95	0	0	95	100%
Federal Consensus Party	93	0	0	93	100%
Federal Humanist Party	0	293	0	293	0%
Republican Party of Oportia	0	0	10	10	0%
Independent	25	5	20	50	50%
Total	473	298	30	801	59.1%

Analysis

The coalition parties voted for the bill as a bloc. Among them was the Civic Governance Alliance, whose Clean Government Act, 1750 had stalled without a vote and whose Clean Government and Political Reform Act, 1754 had been defeated in the Assembly. The whole of the Federal Humanist Party opposition voted against the bill, with no Humanist crossing, while the Republican Party of Oportia abstained. Twenty-five of the fifty independents supported the bill, five opposed it, and twenty abstained, the thirteen led by Piti Gándara among the supporters as before.

Chamber of Peers

The Chamber of Peers, the appointed upper house of mostly crossbench members, concurred on 17.X.1760 AN by 55 votes to 53, with 10 abstentions. As a revising house the Chamber may delay or amend an ordinary bill but cannot block one, and a bill on which it takes no decision within sixty days is deemed passed; it made no amendment.

Royal Assent

King Sinchi Roca II granted Royal Assent on 20.X.1760 AN, and the Act came into force on that day. Under its Article 22 the year-round register of party accounts and large donations and the regulation of political action committees take effect on a day the Federal Elections Commission appoints, not later than one year after the Assent.

See also

• Federal Accord coalition agreement, 1759
• Comprehensive Anti-Corruption Act, 1721
• Federal Audit Office Establishment and Function Act, 1737
• Anti-Corruption Agency (Mandate and Resources) Act, 1756
• Government Code of Conduct
• Federal Elections Commission (Nouvelle Alexandrie)
• Federal Campaign Finance Act, 1686
• Campaign Finance Transparency Act, 1741
• Office of Political Finance Oversight
• Clean Government and Political Reform Act, 1754
• 14th Cortes Federales