Talk:Convention of Huyenkula

Excellent work. I really like it. Some thoughts:

• The role of the joint depository of the MTO and the OHL should be explicitly stated in the Convention text
• Perhaps a greater role of the MTO Court to declare breaches of the Convention.... Hmm...

––Ric (talk) 14:32, 3 May 2026 (UTC)

No other thoughts from anyone, lol? Ric (talk) 15:49, 23 May 2026 (UTC)

So sorry, Ric! Apologies for the slow reply here. I was active in other corners of the wiki and let this sit far longer than I should have. No excuse, just got pulled in too many directions. Thank you for the kind words and for the thoughts, both are good ones! Agreed on the depositary role, this should be fixed. Right now the joint depositary shows up piecemeal across the text. What if I add a dedicated article in the final provisions that consolidates those functions in one place? Registration of instruments, custody of the official text, circulation of amendment proposals, etc with both institutions named as joint custodians? On the MTO Court, I want to think through before committing, and I think your "Hmm" is the right instinct. The Convention is built as... well... "soft law"? on purpose. Mediation findings are advisory, MTO Opinions carry no binding effect, and that tracks how the MTO works under the General Membership Treaty. Letting the Court declare breaches outright is a big change and it runs into two issues, as I see them. One: the Convention is open to non-MTO states, who wouldn't fall under the Court's jurisdiction at all. So a Court-breach mechanism would only bind part of the membership, which is messy, I think. And two: compulsory jurisdiction would probably make some states think twice about ratifying? Or at least that would be my fear. That would cut against the whole point of opening this to everyone. So instead of building it into the core text, maybe we can have two milder options: the Court issues an advisory determination of breach where the parties consent to its jurisdiction, which fits the consent-based model already in Article 20, or maybe we can do an optional protocol that states can opt into for binding breach-declarations, leaving the core Convention soft? I personally lean toward the optional protocol. It lets the states that want teeth have them without scaring off the ones that don't. I am very much open to being talked out of it though. What's your thinking? Edgard (talk) 23:35, 23 May 2026 (UTC)