An Act to establish a comprehensive framework for the classification, protection, and controlled disclosure of information critical to the national security and intelligence operations of the Federation; to regulate access to state secrets and establish penalties for unauthorized disclosure; to provide for the oversight of classified information systems; to modernize information security protocols in accordance with contemporary threats; among other purposes.
The State Secrets Act of 1745 is a New Alexandrian law that establishes a comprehensive framework for the classification, protection, and controlled disclosure of national security information. The Act creates a three-tier classification system (TOP SECRET, SECRET, and CONFIDENTIAL), regulates security clearances and access to classified materials, and establishes criminal penalties for unauthorized disclosure ranging up to 20 years imprisonment for espionage.
The legislation represents the first major codification of state secrets law in the Federation's history, consolidating previously scattered regulations and executive directives into a unified statutory framework. Introduced by Deputy Carmen Sofia Jiménez-Aguirre of the Federal Humanist Party as part of the Jimenez government's national security modernization program, the bill passed the 11th Cortes Federales with unified FHP support and backing from security-minded Federal Consensus Party deputies over unanimous opposition from the Alliance for a Just Nouvelle Alexandrie. King Sinchi Roca II granted Royal Assent on 28.XII.1745AN.
Prior to the State Secrets Act, classification of sensitive government information in Nouvelle Alexandrie operated under a patchwork of executive directives, departmental regulations, and inherited practices from the pre-Federation intelligence services of Alduria and the Wechua Nation. The Spring Crisis of 1739 exposed critical deficiencies in this ad hoc system when investigators discovered that inconsistent classification practices had contributed to intelligence failures preceding the coup attempt.
The subsequent parliamentary inquiry into the Spring Crisis documented how classified information about suspected disloyalty within the III Combined Arms Corps had been compartmentalized in ways that prevented effective analysis and warning. The National Intelligence Oversight Committee reported that at least seven different classification standards were in use across the New Alexandrian Intelligence Community, creating barriers to information sharing that the National Intelligence Coordination Center (NICC), established in 1740AN, struggled to overcome.
Foreign intelligence activities against the Federation intensified following the East Keltian Collapse, with the Federal Intelligence Agency of Nouvelle Alexandrie documenting a 34% increase in suspected espionage operations between 1740AN and 1744AN. The successful disruption of the 1744 Nouvelle Alexandrie election terror plot demonstrated improved intelligence coordination, but also revealed vulnerabilities in how classified threat information was handled across federal and regional agencies.
The Director of National Intelligence, Fouad Al-Khamenei, recommended comprehensive legislation to standardize classification practices in his annual report to the Council of State in 1744AN. The National Security Committee endorsed this recommendation, and the Jimenez government included the State Secrets Act in its legislative program announced in the Speech from the Throne for 1745AN.
Legislative debate
The State Secrets Act generated substantial controversy in the 11th Cortes Federales, with opposition parties raising concerns about civil liberties implications and the potential for abuse.
Opposition objections
The Democratic Socialist Party mounted the most sustained opposition. DSP leader Martina Vásquez characterized the bill as "a charter for government secrecy that will shield wrongdoing from democratic accountability." DSP Deputy Carlos Mendoza of the Wechua Nation argued that Article 3's prohibition on classifying information to conceal violations of law was inadequate, noting that the government itself would determine whether classification served legitimate purposes.
The DSP particularly criticized the 25-year automatic declassification period in Article 12 as excessive, arguing that most democratic nations employed shorter timeframes. Deputy Gabrielle Fitzgerald, former Leader of the Opposition, warned that the exemptions from automatic declassification were "so broad as to swallow the rule entirely," potentially allowing indefinite classification of politically sensitive materials.
The Wakara People's Party raised concerns grounded in both civil liberties principles and the party's broader commitment to government transparency. WPP leader Gueyacán Vázquez argued that classification authority concentrated in executive hands posed risks to democratic accountability, particularly for minority communities whose interests might conflict with those of federal security agencies. The WPP noted that classification could be used to withhold records of historical government conduct, including treaty negotiations, land transfers, and administrative decisions affecting Wakara and Wechua communities. Vázquez also criticized the bill's failure to establish clear protections for documents in minority languages or those relating to cultural heritage, warning that the classification framework could effectively suppress historical scholarship and community memory.
United for Alvelo Deputy Pablo Alvelo Nieves focused on whistleblower provisions, arguing that Article 24's requirement to report through "appropriate channels" would effectively silence those who discovered wrongdoing within the intelligence community itself. Alvelo Nieves introduced amendments to create independent whistleblower review mechanisms that were rejected in committee.
The Federal Consensus Party expressed mixed views. FCP leader Morissa Baumann acknowledged the need for standardized classification procedures but questioned whether the bill provided sufficient parliamentary oversight. FCP Deputy Elena Vásquez of Valencia argued that the penalties in Article 18 were disproportionate, particularly the 10-year maximum for unauthorized disclosure without proof of intent to harm national security.
Amendments adopted
The government accepted several amendments to address FCP concerns and secure broader support.
The Parliamentary Oversight Enhancement Amendment, introduced by FCP Deputy Jorge Delgado of Alduria, strengthened Article 16 by requiring quarterly classified briefings to designated Cortes committees rather than permitting such briefings on request. The amendment also established a dedicated Classification Practices Subcommittee within the National Security and Intelligence Committee with authority to review classification decisions.
The Whistleblower Protection Strengthening Amendment, introduced by FCP Deputy Ricardo Fuentes of South Lyrica, enhanced Article 24 by establishing an independent Whistleblower Review Panel within the National Intelligence Oversight Committee to receive and investigate complaints from intelligence community personnel. The amendment provided that employees who reported concerns to this panel would receive protection even if their concerns were ultimately determined to be unfounded, provided the report was made in good faith.
The Classification Review Mechanism Amendment created a new Article 17A establishing an independent Classification Appeals Board with authority to review classification decisions challenged by Cortes members or officials with appropriate clearances. The Board, comprising retired judges and former intelligence officials, would provide non-binding recommendations on whether specific information warranted continued classification.
The Declassification Acceleration Amendment reduced the automatic declassification period in Article 12 from 25 years to 20 years and required the Director of National Intelligence to conduct interim reviews at 10-year intervals to determine whether earlier declassification was appropriate.
Passage
Despite amendments, the Alliance for a Just Nouvelle Alexandrie maintained unified opposition. DSP leader Martina Vásquez dismissed the adopted amendments as "procedural window dressing that leaves the fundamental architecture of secrecy intact." WPP leader Gueyacán Vázquez argued that the amendments failed to address the structural imbalance between executive classification authority and legislative oversight, noting that the Classification Appeals Board's non-binding recommendations provided insufficient check on executive discretion. The WPP also criticized the absence of any mechanism to protect historical and cultural records from indefinite classification. UfA Deputy Pablo Alvelo Nieves criticized the Whistleblower Review Panel as "an internal mechanism that will protect the institution rather than the whistleblower."
The Federal Consensus Party split on the final vote. Security-minded deputies, particularly those representing border regions and those with military backgrounds, voted in favor. FCP Deputy Jorge Delgado argued during floor debate that "effective intelligence protection is essential for national security, and these amendments ensure the necessary democratic safeguards are in place." FCP leader Morissa Baumann voted against, stating that the classification system remained "excessively weighted toward secrecy rather than transparency."
The bill passed the Federal Assembly on 8.XII.1745AN with 452 votes in favor and 290 against, with 7 abstentions. The Chamber of Peers approved the legislation on 18.XII.1745AN by a vote of 96-19, with 7 abstentions.
Key provisions
Classification system
The Act establishes three levels of classification for sensitive government information. TOP SECRET applies to information whose unauthorized disclosure could cause "exceptionally grave damage" to national security. SECRET applies to information whose disclosure could cause "serious damage." CONFIDENTIAL applies to information whose disclosure could cause "damage" to national security. Article 3 explicitly prohibits classification to conceal violations of law, inefficiency, administrative error, embarrassment, or to restrain competition.
Classification authority
Original classification authority is restricted to the Premier, Vice-Premier, agency heads designated by the Premier in the Federal Registry, and officials delegated this authority under implementing regulations. The Act requires that the number of officials authorized to classify information originally be kept to "the minimum required for administrative efficiency." Officials authorized to classify at a specified level may also classify at lower levels.
Security clearances and access
Access to classified information requires a determination that the individual needs such access for authorized activities and is trustworthy. Article 6 specifies factors to be considered in trustworthiness determinations, including allegiance to the Federation, foreign influence, personal conduct, emotional stability, substance abuse history, financial considerations, and outside activities and associations. The "need to know" principle restricts access to individuals who require specific classified information to perform their official duties.
Special access programs
The Premier may authorize special access programs to protect particularly sensitive information, subject to security procedures beyond those normally required for the relevant classification level. The number of such programs must be kept to "an absolute minimum" and is subject to periodic review by the Director of National Intelligence.
Declassification
All classified information is subject to automatic declassification 20 years from the date of original classification, with interim reviews at 10-year intervals. Exemptions from automatic declassification apply to information that would reveal intelligence sources or methods, compromise ongoing diplomatic negotiations, violate statutes or international agreements, impair foreign relations capabilities, or endanger individuals. The Director of National Intelligence must maintain a comprehensive program for systematic declassification review, prioritizing information of greatest public interest and historical value.
Oversight mechanisms
The Director of National Intelligence serves as principal advisor to the Premier on implementation and issues implementing regulations. The Cortes Federales maintains continuing oversight through designated committees receiving quarterly classified briefings. The Classification Practices Subcommittee reviews classification decisions, while the Classification Appeals Board provides independent review of challenged decisions. Each agency with original classification authority must designate an inspector general to conduct periodic reviews.
Criminal penalties
Knowing and willful disclosure of classified information to unauthorized persons is punishable by up to NAX€100,000 fine, 10 years imprisonment, or both. Disclosure to foreign governments or agents is punishable by up to NAX€250,000 fine, 20 years imprisonment, or both. Gross negligence permitting classified information to be removed, lost, stolen, or destroyed is punishable by up to NAX€50,000 fine, 5 years imprisonment, or both.
Whistleblower protections
Federal employees who report violations through appropriate channels receive protection from retaliation. Appropriate channels include inspectors general, the Director of National Intelligence, designated Cortes committees, and the Whistleblower Review Panel within the National Intelligence Oversight Committee. Employees reporting in good faith receive protection even if concerns are ultimately unfounded.
Legislative history
Legislative history of the State Secrets Act, 1745
The State Secrets Act passed the Federal Assembly with unanimous Federal Humanist Party support. All 381 FHP deputies voted in favor. The legislation attracted support from 68 Federal Consensus Party deputies, primarily those with military backgrounds or representing border regions concerned about intelligence vulnerabilities. Three independent deputies also voted in favor.
Bill as submitted to the "Hopper" of the Federal Assembly, 1745 AN
STATE SECRETS ACT, 1745
THE READING OF
A
BILL
TO
Establish a comprehensive framework for the classification, protection, and controlled disclosure of information critical to the national security and intelligence operations of the Federation; to regulate access to state secrets and establish penalties for unauthorized disclosure; to provide for the oversight of classified information systems; to modernize information security protocols in accordance with contemporary threats; among other purposes.
This Act may be cited as the "State Secrets Act, 1745".
Article 2: Definitions.
For the purposes of this Act:
"Classified information" means any information or material, regardless of its physical form or characteristics, that is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the Federal Government and has been determined pursuant to this Act or any predecessor Act to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security;
"National security" means the national defense and foreign relations of the Federation of Nouvelle Alexandrie;
"Director" means the Director of National Intelligence as established under the laws of the Federation;
"Intelligence Community" means the New Alexandrian Intelligence Community as defined by law;
"Original classification authority" means an individual authorized in writing, either by the President of the Government, the Vice-President of the Government, or by such officials designated by the President, to classify information in the first instance;
"Derivative classification" means the incorporating, paraphrasing, restating, or generating in new form information that is already classified;
"Classification" means the process of determining that official information requires, in the interests of national security, protection against unauthorized disclosure;
"Declassification" means the authorized change in the status of classified information to unclassified information;
"Unauthorized disclosure" means a communication or physical transfer of classified information to an unauthorized recipient;
"Need to know" means a determination that a prospective recipient requires access to specific classified information in order to perform or assist in a lawful and authorized governmental function;
"Federal employee" means any person employed by the Federal Government, including military personnel;
"Contractor" means any individual or entity that has entered into a contract, agreement, or arrangement with the Federal Government;
"Foreign agent" means any person who acts in the Federation as an agent, representative, employee, or servant of a foreign government or foreign political organization;
"Espionage" means the act of obtaining, delivering, transmitting, communicating, or receiving information relating to the national defense with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the injury of the Federation or to the advantage of any foreign nation.
PART II CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM AND AUTHORITY.
Article 3: Classification Levels.
Information may be classified at one of the following three levels:
"TOP SECRET" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security;
"SECRET" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security;
"CONFIDENTIAL" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.
Information may not be classified in order to conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; to prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; to restrain competition; or to prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of national security.
Article 4: Original Classification Authority.
The authority to classify information originally may be exercised only by:
The President of the Government;
The Vice-President of the Government;
Agency heads and officials designated by the President of the Government in the Federal Registry;
Officials delegated this authority pursuant to regulations issued under this Act.
Officials authorized to classify information at a specified level are also authorized to classify information at a lower level.
The number of officials authorized to classify information originally shall be kept to the minimum required for administrative efficiency.
Article 5: Classification Standards.
Information shall be classified as long as required by national security considerations. When it no longer meets the standards for classification under this Act, it shall be declassified.
Classified information shall not be declassified automatically as a result of any unofficial publication or inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure in the Federation or abroad of identical or similar information.
The original classification authority shall, where practicable, establish a specific date or event for declassification based on the duration of the national security sensitivity of the information.
PART III ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
Article 6: Security Clearances.
Access to classified information by any person may be granted only upon a determination that such person requires such access in connection with authorized activities and upon a determination that such person is trustworthy.
The following factors shall be considered in determining trustworthiness:
Allegiance to the Federation of Nouvelle Alexandrie;
Foreign influence and preference;
Personal conduct and character;
Emotional stability;
Alcohol and substance abuse;
Financial considerations;
Outside activities and associations.
Security clearances shall be reviewed periodically and may be revoked if the individual no longer meets the requirements for access.
Article 7: Need to Know Principle.
Access to classified information shall be granted only to individuals who have a demonstrable need to know the information to perform their official duties.
Officials responsible for classification shall ensure that access to classified information is limited to the minimum number of individuals required for the efficient operation of government.
Article 8: Special Access Programs.
The President of the Government may authorize special access programs to protect particularly sensitive information.
Special access programs shall be subject to the creation of special security procedures beyond those normally required for access to confidential, secret, or top secret information.
The number of special access programs shall be kept to an absolute minimum and shall be subject to periodic review by the Director of National Intelligence.
PART IV SAFEGUARDING AND SECURITY MEASURES.
Article 9: Physical Security Requirements.
Classified information shall be safeguarded by security measures proportionate to its classification level.
Requirements for physical security include:
Secure storage facilities meeting specifications established by regulation;
Access controls limiting entry to authorized personnel;
Procedures for transportation and handling of classified materials;
Requirements for destruction of classified waste.
Article 10: Information Security Protocols.
All classified information systems shall incorporate security measures appropriate to the classification level of the information processed.
Security protocols shall include:
User authentication and access controls;
Encryption of classified information during transmission and storage;
Network security measures to prevent unauthorized access;
Audit trails to monitor access to classified information;
Incident response procedures for security breaches.
Article 11: Personnel Security.
All persons with access to classified information shall receive security briefings appropriate to their level of access.
Personnel shall be required to sign non-disclosure agreements acknowledging their understanding of the requirements for protecting classified information.
Termination procedures shall ensure that access to classified information is revoked upon conclusion of authorized duties.
PART V DECLASSIFICATION AND PUBLIC ACCESS.
Article 12: Automatic Declassification.
Except as provided herein, all classified information shall be automatically declassified on December 31st of the year that is 20 years from the date of original classification.
Information may be exempted from automatic declassification only if its release would:
Reveal an intelligence source or method;
Compromise ongoing diplomatic negotiations;
Violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement;
Impair the ability of responsible officials to conduct foreign relations;
Endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.
Interim reviews shall be conducted at 10-year intervals to determine whether earlier declassification is appropriate.
Article 13: Systematic Declassification Review.
The Director of National Intelligence shall establish and maintain a comprehensive program for the systematic review and declassification of classified information.
Priority shall be given to information of the greatest public interest and historical value.
Declassification activities shall be conducted in accordance with priorities established by the National Security Committee.
Article 14: Mandatory Declassification Review.
Any person may request the review for declassification of classified information.
Agencies shall conduct a review of any classified information requested under this section and shall release such information unless its disclosure would cause identifiable damage to national security.
PART VI OVERSIGHT AND ADMINISTRATION.
Article 15: Director of National Intelligence Responsibilities.
The Director of National Intelligence shall serve as the principal advisor to the President of the Government on all matters relating to the implementation of this Act.
The Director shall issue regulations to implement this Act and shall ensure compliance across all agencies of the Federal Government.
The Director shall provide annual reports to the Cortes Federales on the status of classification and declassification activities.
Article 16: Cortes Federales Oversight.
The Cortes Federales shall maintain continuing oversight of the classification system established by this Act.
Relevant committees of both chambers shall receive quarterly classified briefings on classification policies and practices within their jurisdiction.
The Classification Practices Subcommittee of the National Security and Intelligence Committee shall review classification decisions and may issue recommendations for declassification.
The National Security Committee shall brief appropriate committees on matters affecting national security, subject to appropriate security measures.
Article 17: Inspector General Review.
Each agency with original classification authority shall designate an inspector general or equivalent official to conduct periodic reviews of the agency's classification practices.
Such reviews shall assess compliance with this Act and identify areas for improvement in classification and security practices.
Article 17A: Classification Appeals Board.
There is hereby established a Classification Appeals Board to review classification decisions challenged by members of the Cortes Federales or officials with appropriate security clearances.
The Board shall comprise five members: two retired judges appointed by the President of the Government, two former intelligence officials appointed by the Classification Practices Subcommittee, and one member appointed jointly.
The Board shall provide non-binding recommendations on whether specific information warrants continued classification.
Board proceedings and recommendations shall be classified at the level of the information under review.
PART VII PENALTIES AND ENFORCEMENT.
Article 18: Criminal Penalties.
Any person who knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes, transmits, or otherwise makes available to an unauthorized person classified information shall be punished by a fine not exceeding 100,000 écu or imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or both.
Any person who knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes, transmits, or otherwise makes available to a foreign government or foreign agent classified information shall be punished by a fine not exceeding 250,000 écu or imprisonment not exceeding 20 years, or both.
Any person who, through gross negligence, permits classified information to be removed from its proper place of custody or to be lost, stolen, abstracted, or destroyed shall be punished by a fine not exceeding 50,000 écu or imprisonment not exceeding 5 years, or both.
Article 19: Administrative Sanctions.
Federal employees who violate the provisions of this Act may be subject to administrative sanctions including:
Reprimand or censure;
Suspension without pay;
Reduction in grade or pay;
Termination of employment;
Revocation of security clearance.
Contractors who violate this Act may have their contracts terminated and may be barred from future government contracts.
Article 20: Civil Remedies.
The Federal Government may seek injunctive relief to prevent violations of this Act.
Any person who suffers damage as a result of unauthorized disclosure of classified information may seek civil remedies under applicable law.
PART VIII SPECIAL PROVISIONS.
Article 21: Protection of Intelligence Sources and Methods.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to require the disclosure of intelligence sources and methods.
Information concerning intelligence sources and methods shall be exempt from declassification unless specifically authorized by the Director of National Intelligence in consultation with the originating agency.
Article 22: International Agreements.
Classified information received from foreign governments shall be protected in accordance with the terms of applicable international agreements.
Such information may not be declassified without the consent of the originating government unless required by federal law.
Article 23: Emergency Procedures.
During declared national emergencies, the President of the Government may authorize temporary modifications to classification procedures to protect national security.
Such modifications shall be limited in scope and duration and shall be reported to the Cortes Federales.
Article 24: Whistleblower Protections.
Federal employees who report violations of this Act through appropriate channels shall be protected from retaliation.
Appropriate channels include inspectors general, the Director of National Intelligence, designated parliamentary committees, and the Whistleblower Review Panel.
The Whistleblower Review Panel within the National Intelligence Oversight Committee shall receive and investigate complaints from intelligence community personnel.
Employees who report concerns in good faith shall receive protection from retaliation even if the concerns are ultimately determined to be unfounded.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
PART IX CLOSING PROVISIONS.
Article 25: Regulations.
The Director of National Intelligence shall issue implementing regulations within 180 days of the enactment of this Act.
Such regulations shall be developed in consultation with affected agencies and shall be published in the Federal Registry.
Article 26: Transition Provisions.
All information classified under predecessor Acts shall remain classified under this Act until reviewed in accordance with the standards established herein.
Existing security clearances shall remain valid subject to periodic review as required by this Act.
Article 27: Severability.
If any provision of this Act is held to be unconstitutional or invalid, the remainder of the Act shall not be affected.
Article 28: Commencement and Application.
This Act shall apply to all of the Federation of Nouvelle Alexandrie.
This Act shall not become law unless it has been given Royal Assent.
This Act shall be published and made publicly available.
In the event any provision or part of this Act is found to be invalid or unenforceable, only that particular provision or part so found, and not the entire Act, will be inoperative.
This Act shall take effect 90 days after receiving Royal Assent.
