Introductory Military Strategy and Tactics (WS-1000)

The Introductory Military Strategy and Tactics course is offered by the Royal University of Gotzborg's King Charles III War Studies College. The course is the first required to attain the Command and Staff Officer Certificate for commissioned members of the Royal Army and Royal Navy.

Course Information

Course Information	Details
Course Title	Introductory Military Strategy and Tactics
Course Designation	WS-1000
Suggested Audiences	Royal Army and Royal Navy candidates & General Interest
Length	4-part Lecture Series
Exam	Integrated with Command and Staff Officer Course Exam
Associated Certificate(s)	Command and Staff Officer Certificate
Instructor	Juergen de Cautzburg
School	King Charles III War Studies College
Original Release	2010
Content Last Updated	2010

Lecture Series

Introductory Remarks

Several others before me have dealt with military strategy and tactics in a variety of books or/and articles. It would be a huge mistake if we were to assume that all principles are to be taken as undisputed truth and that they preclude any opposite interpretation.

The structure and style of the various postings may raise some eyebrows in the world of specialists with very strict academic lenses, but the simplified and comprehensive design is intentionally adopted in order, to enlighten the general learned reader and all those who wish to approach the essential to the principles of the modern warfare, but are somehow lost in the density of the forest and find difficulty in understanding its gradual evolution.

-- Colonel Juergen de Cautzburg, Superintendent the King Charles III War Studies College

Lesson 1

In warfare, related terms referring, respectively, to large-scale and small-scale planning to achieve military success. Strategy lays out the goals that need to be accomplished and the ideas for achieving those goals. Strategy can be complex multi-layered plans for accomplishing objectives and may give consideration to tactics.

However, not all theorists of war make this a primary distinction:

• Karl von Clausewitz's theory about military strategy is part of the larger political pattern and all the nation's resources are to be subordinated to the task of attaining the political objective of the war; to this concerted effort he gave the name “grand strategy”.
• Antoine H. Jomini, general and an influential military theorist, regarded strategy as the art of moving forces to the field of battle and tactics as the conduct of forces in battle.
• Another school views strategy as a means of bringing the enemy to battle and tactics as the means of defeating him in battle.
• Some theorists focus on clear sets of general principles; some wrote books on principles, formations and manoeuvres; and still others dwell on the importance of spirit or other intangibles.

Tactics is sometimes disparaged as being part of minor arts as strategy only is worth to be considered. Tactics is nevertheless the essential base for warfare. Tactics are the meat and bread of the strategy. They are the “doing” aspect that follows the planning. Tactics refer specifically to action. In the strategy phase of a conflict, the staff members decide how to achieve the goal. In other words they anticipated about how troops will act, i.e., tactics. They decide on what tactics will be employed to fulfill the strategy.

We must not forget, that the tactical concepts of a commanding officer, closely linked to the terrain and rigorously carried out are critical for the outcome of a battle:

This is exactly what happened on the famous occasion when Hannibal was hemmed in among the mountains on the road to Casilinum and to all appearances entrapped by the dictator Fabius. The stratagem which Hannibal devised to baffle his foes was remarkably, when night came on, bundles of twigs were fastened to the horns of some 2,000 oxen and set on fire, the terrified animals being then quickly driven along the mountain side towards the passes which were beset by the enemy. The strange spectacle of these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and discomfited the Romans that they withdrew from their position and Hannibal's army passed safely through the defile.

According as circumstances are favourable, one should modify one's plans. On the eve of the battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the cavalry, went to the Duke of Wellington in order to learn what his plans and calculations were for the next day, because, as he explained, he might suddenly find himself Commander-in-chief and would be unable to frame new plans in a critical moment. The Duke listened quietly and then said : "Who will attack the first tomorrow - I or Bonaparte ?" "Bonaparte" replied Lord Uxbridge. "Well", continued the Duke, "Bonaparte has not given me any idea of his projects; and as my plans will depend upon his, how can you expect me to tell you what mine are” ? (The truth of this pithy and profound saying will be admitted by every soldier, then Wellington, great in so many military qualities, was especially distinguished by "the extraordinary skill with which he concealed his movements and deceived both friend and foe".)

A battle, won or lost at tactical level is likely to have far-reaching consequences. Thus, the furious charge carried out by Sobieski’s cavalry against Kara Mustapha Pacha’s Turkish troops, in front of Vienna in 1683 that had set the fate of the Ottoman power for over a century and had led to the European decline of the Sublime Porte.

The tactics are the things that get the job done. Strategies can comprise numerous tactics, with many people involved in attempting to reach an overall goal. While strategy tends to involve the higher ups of an military staff, tactics tend to involve all members on the “ground.

Lesson learned

1. Strategy is the art of using battles to win the war and tactics is the art of using troops, battleships and 3rd dimension’s means in battle.
2. There is but one root- principle underlying victory, but the tactics which lead up to it are infinite in number.
3. The rules of strategy are few and simple. They may be learned in a week. They may be taught by familiar illustrations or a dozen diagrams. But such knowledge will no more teach a man to lead an army like Napoleon than knowledge of grammar will teach him to write like Gibbon.

Bibliography

• An Introduction in Strategy by A. Beaufre;
• Les Campagnes du Empereur by R Dupuy;
• The Encyclopedia of Military History;
• Words on Wellington by Sir W Fraser;
• Words by Colonel Henderson.

Lesson 2

In the previous lesson, we saw an introduction in strategy and tactics. The bottom line is: You must get the right people and the right equipment at the right time. This week we will see in our mini-series “the principles of war”. Let’s begin.

The Principles of War

The principles of war (Objective, Offensive Action, Surprise, Concentration, Economy of Force, Security, Mobility and Cooperation) are based on the theories and discussions by Jomini and Clausewitz (late 18th century). Nowadays, almost all scholars of the art and science of warfare believe that the basic principles of war, strategy and tactics have changed little throughout time. Most will concede that Gilgamesh (2000 BC), Sun Tzu (500 BC), Josephus (AD 70), Machiavelli (AD 1500) or Clausewitz (AD 1820) are as important for the student of military strategy and tactic today as they were when written.

The nine principles of war provide general guidance for the conduct of war at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Today's Armed Forces recognizes the following nine principles of war. However, the former German Wehrmachtsdoktrine includes Annihilation as well.

Objective

The ultimate military purpose of war is the neutralization of the enemy's armed forces and will to combat. The linkage between objectives at all levels of war is crucial and the different operations must contribute to the ultimate strategic aim.

Lesson learned : Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective.

Offensive

Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results.

Lesson learned : Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

Mass

Synchronizing all the elements of combat power where they will have decisive effect on an enemy force in a short period of time is to achieve mass. Mass has to smash the enemy, not sting him. This results from the proper combination of combat power with the proper application of other principles of war. Lesson learned : Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time.

Economy of Force

Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. When the time comes for action, all parts must act.

Lesson learned : Employ all combat power available in the most effective way possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.

Maneuver

Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to gain positional advantage. Maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and protects the force.

Lesson learned : Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.

Unity of Command

Unity of command means that all the forces are under one responsible commander. It requires a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces in pursuit of a unified purpose.

Lesson learned : For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of effort.

Security

Security enhances freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by a commander to protect his forces.

Lesson learned : Never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage.

Surprise

Surprise can decisively shift the balance of combat power. By seeking surprise, forces can achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Surprise can be in tempo, size of force, direction or location of main effort and timing. Deception can aid the probability of achieving surprise.

Lesson learned : Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared.

Simplicity

Everything in war is very simple, but the simple thing is often difficult and to armchair strateges, military operations are never difficult. Simple plans and clear, concise orders neutrlize misunderstanding and confusion. Simplicity is valuable when soldiers and leaders are tired.

Lesson learned : Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.

Note: Sun Tzu's small tome written about 500 BC embodied almost all about the fundamentals of strategy & tactics and these unchanging principles are the foundation on which is slowly built a superstructure.

Bibliography

• Art of War (Sun Tzu);
• Der Krieg (von Clausewitz);
• Fundamentals of Strategy and Tactics (Hart).

Lesson 3

Military doctrines of some countries are often unable to respond to fast moving scenarios as they are often based on the outcomes of past conflicts. The failure of many nations to anticipate the end of the cavalry charge with the development of the self propelled tank resulted in huge losses. The dominance of the aircraft carrier over the battle cruiser and battleship was realized after it was live-tested at sea. Without a rational valuation of the trends in technology we will see the next generation of white elephants.

Winning battles and losing war

The front line obviously includes the Royal Army’s lieutenants, captains, lieutenant- colonels, colonels and general officers in charge of a command within the land forces. Their vocation is actually action in operations and this action basically relates to tactics. This is essential for anyone whatever his level is. In a given time-space framework, the conditions of commitment may differ for each level and each committed unit. Subsequently, these specific conditions confer on any tactical leader some part of autonomy for reflection and action. We observe it today for the leaders of our deployed units in OROS and we will see "the art of combining, in operations the action of all military assets in order to reach the objectives assigned by the operational strategy".

In a spectrum of missions ranging from peace-keeping to counterinsurgency, the parameters of commitment became more numerous, unsure and sometimes extremely varied on a same theater. The manual of general tactics starts from the principle that tactics still remains the transcendent element of a maneuver being deliberate, conducted, consolidated. However, the ends of this maneuver evolved :

• compelling the adversary rather than crushing them,
• controlling the environment to take advantage of it,
• influencing perceptions in order to legitimate the action and to generate adherence.

Military action in stability operations is then focused on security. Counterinsurgency, area control and interposing operations are subsequently becoming usual courses of action. Roles of branches and operational functions are widening, like intelligence which takes interest not only in the adversary but also in understanding the whole of actors of the conflict. It is at the tactical level that battles can be either won or lost.

Of winning battles is best conveyed through an anecdote about a meeting between Hannibal Barca and a pastime strategist. Hannibal suffered from what has been Napoleon’s failing - winning battles but losing wars. Hannibal won all of his battles in the Second Punic War except, for Carthage that did not deserve him, the last one, against Scipio Africanus at Zama in 202 BC. It is reported that Hannibal had little patience with amateur critics.

Napoleon was in a position to know, like Hannibal he was good at winning campaigns, but he failed as a strategist. The Imperial France pursued political goals that were beyond its means - that is a failure in strategy.

Napoleon played a major role in the history and development of the military art. However, Napoleon was no great innovator as a soldier. He distrusted novel ideas, disbanding the balloon companies inherited from the armies of the Revolution and rejected Roger Fulton's offer of submarines and naval mines. He disliked the Navy officers and unlike in the Imperial Army, one does not pronounce “Sieur” when addressing Navy officers (for example, “A vous ordre Amiral” instead of “A vous ordre Sieur ”). This custom dated back to the Battle of Trafalgar, when the “Great Corsian” decided that Navy officers did not deserve to be called "Sieur".

His genius was essentially practical and his military concepts evolved from the close study of earlier commanders, particularly Frederick the Great. He made the fullest use of the ideas of his predecessors and breathed a new life into them.

Napoleon’s military concepts were relayed through the writings of Antoine Henri Jominie. Through his writings an emphasis was put on the Napoleonic strategy.

Please consider this:

“Tactics, evolutions, artillery and engineer sciences can be learned from manuals like geometry; but the knowledge of the higher conduct of war can only be acquired by studying the history of wars and the battles of great generals and by one’s own experience. There are no terse and precise rules at all; everything depends on the character with which nature has endowed the general, on his eminent qualities, on his deficiencies, on the nature of the troops, the techniques or arms, the season and a thousand other circumstances which make things never look alike”.

Thus ended history’s most flagrant examples of winning all the battles but losing the final war, it is a sort of military oxymoron that often leaves armchair strategists scratching their heads. But such a phenomenon is more than just a freakish occurrence; it can be the starkest kind of barometer of effectiveness, one those involved ignore at their own risk.

Wisdom in strategy must be practical - because strategy is a practical subject. Much of what appears to be wise and indeed is prudent as high theory is unhelpful to the Staff who actually has to do strategy, tactically and operationally.

The other example of great strategic wisdom that is difficult to translate into practical advice is the insistence of Clausewitz and Jomini, that “the best strategy is always to be very strong; first in general, and then at the decisive point”. Naturally the challenge is not to comprehend the all but sophomoric point that one needs to be very strong at the decisive point. Rather it is to know the location of that “decisive point”.

The main reasons why strategy is so difficult to do well can be subsumed with reference to three requirements.

For strategic success:

• forces must be internally coherent, which is to say competently joint ,
• be of a quantity and provide a strategic effect scaled to the tasks set by high policy,
• be employed coercively in pursuit of military objectives that fit political goals. Competence cannot offset folly along the means-ends axis of strategy.

Our history books are littered with nations that won battles in the wrong wars. We know that the future is unpredictable - consequently, do never put faith in the phrase “foreseeable future” - take in consideration assets that can be trusted.

Specifically, if we plan to behave strategically in an uncertain future on the basis of three sources of practical advice:

• historical experience,
• the golden rule of prudence,
• our common sense.

Lessons Learned

We can educate our common sense by reading history. Always remember - the future has not happened and our expectations of it can only be guesswork. Historically guided guesswork should perform better than one that knows no yesterdays, however, planning for the future, like deciding to fight, is always a gamble. To conclude on a positive note, remember that to succeed in strategy you do not have to be distinguished or even particularly competent. All that is required is performing well enough to neutralize an enemy. You do not have to win elegantly; you just have to win.

Bibliography

• The Military maxims of Napoleon (W. Cairnes);
• "The Influence of Clausewitz" in On War (M. Howard);
• Battles of Hannibal.

Lesson 4

Why is Clauzewitzian strategy difficult to achieve?

As many of you doubtless already know, Clausewitz is one work that cannot be read quickly. He is not quite as taxing as Hegel, but more than one reputable scholar has misread and misrepresented Clausewitz as a result of attempting to digest the work as expeditiously; as many are accustomed to doing with normal works of history. To say that you must read slowly and carefully is not meant to endow Clausewitz with mystique or to accord him excessive reverence, but only to warn that understanding him is a more than normally demanding intellectual chore. The study of Clausewitz’s theories is far from easy and anyone who reads On War with the expectation of easily separating the valuable kernels of pure gold from the chaff of antiquarian detail will be frustrated.

Clausewitz was one of a rare breed of soldiers. As a young ensign of 12, he was part of an army that had been brought to the pinnacle of perfection under the tutelage of Frederick the Great for use in what has been termed the age of limited warfare. Armies of this period represented an investment of capital and manpower that monarchs could never afford to squander in large, set-piece battles. His life contained a number of unexpected benefits and the early campaigning in the 1790s included experience in linear warfare and operations against French partisans in the Vosges Mountains, giving him knowledge of the "wars of detachments" that most Prussian officers never acquired. Along with this practical education, he began to write and published his first piece, a scathing review of a work on military theory, in 1805.

Clausewitz remained involved in the struggle against Napoleon as a reformer in Prussia but most actively as a staff officer in the Russian army. After the Prussian monarch sided with Napoleon, Prussian army reformers sought commissions from the Czar. Clausewitz was present at the battle of Borodino and the crossing of the Berezina River in 1812. He continued to fight with the Russians until 1814 when he was finally readmitted to the Prussian army. During the Waterloo campaign of 1815, Clausewitz served as chief of staff in the Prussian III Corps, the unit that held the attention of Marshal Emmanuel de Grouchy long enough for Napoleon to be defeated at Waterloo by Marshal Gerhard von Blücher and the Duke of Wellington.

Subsequently, Clausewitz was appointed to the post of the director of the War College in Berlin and began to consolidate from the thousands of his handwritten manuscript pages, which gradually coalesced into a comprehensive theory that sought to define universal, permanent elements in war. This material was later to become his most influential work, Vom Kriege (On War).

As the great man wrote, “Everything in strategy is very simple, but that does not mean that everything is very easy”. Though it should be useful to recognize why strategy is difficult, it is scarcely less useful to recognize why the explanation not contribute to the practical solution.

By analogy, the more mechanistic aspects of strategy, like art, can be taught, but people cannot be taught reliably how to be great strategists any more than great artists. Intellectual mastery of purportedly permanent “principles of strategy” is probably helpful but no guarantee of success. Why is strategy difficult to understand? By adapting some texts from On War, we will have six reasons.

Primo - Competence in strategy requires mastery of a challenging complexity. Strategy, after all, is the bridge connecting the threat and use of force with policy or politics. The strategist needs to understand what is tactically and operationally possible in geographical environments, what success or failure in each environment contributes to performance in the other environments. Moreover, strategists have to master the combined meaning of surface forces on land, sea and air.

Secundo - By its nature strategy is more demanding of the intellect and excellence in strategy, requires the strategist to transcend simple categories of thought. The task is not to create wise policy or successful schemes of military action, but rather to build the bridge connecting the two. Brilliant military schemes can be irrelevant or worse if they promise to achieve politically inappropriate objectives.

Tertio - It is difficult to train competent strategists, let alone outstanding ones. There is little in the training of soldiers or state officials to equip them for strategic responsibilities. Military professionals tend to learn how to fight and then, as they are promoted, how to organize others to fight in ever larger, militarily more inclusive formations. The soldier is not taught how engagements should be used “for the object of the war”. Rising state officials can be placed in three groups : career officials fed up with politics, ambitious ones who jockey for power and lazy officials who care for nothing but personal interest. At no point in an outstanding career is there likely to be anything resembling explicit training in strategy for the state official.

Quarto - Strategy is extraordinarily difficult to conduct with consistent excellence because of the unique physical and moral burdens it puts on would-be strategists. The commands in crisis and war can age a person as surely as a disease. The burden of command increases with the growing level of responsibility. As people are promoted from tactical, through operational, to strategic realms of responsibility, the potential physical and moral hindrances to sound performance increase as well.

Quinto - It is worth citing what Clausewitz termed “friction”, the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult and more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper. Clausewitz argues that “everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult”.

Finally - Success in strategy calls for a quality of judgment that cannot be taught. Nowadays, there are trainings for “genius” at the tactical and operational levels of war. Strategic excellence cannot be taught the same way or to anything like the same degree. Strategy inherently requires understanding of the terms of the relationship between military power and political purpose.

In the last 150 years. Clausewitz has been condemned, maligned, misunderstood, praised, and hailed as a genius. It is too early to tell whether or not the current "Clausewitzian” revival is transient or permanent.

What is certain is that Clausewitz has come to mean more to this century than he did to his own.

Lessons Learned

Royal Army doctrine forms a connection between the army component of our kingdom’s military strategy and tactics, techniques and procedures, such as those found in our Royal Armed Force Manuals. A commander, however, cannot operate solely under the guidance of broad strategy. Neither can he make appropriate mission decisions if guided only by tactics and techniques. Doctrine guides our actions toward well-defined goals and provides the basis for mutual understanding within and among the Services and the policymakers. It ensures our familiarity and efficiency in the execution of strategy and tactics

Many apparently well formed officers have lacked the qualities needed for success in high command. As well as luck, success in strategy requires constitutional fortitude, a sophisticated grasp of political essentials & ability to make and stick to judgments in the face of uncertainty. Education can be helpful; however there is truth in the claim that strategists are born rather than educated.

Strategic performance is inescapable. The joke, that “you may not be interested in strategy, but strategy is interested in you”, refers to an enduring truth and the alternative to good strategic performance is fair or poor strategic performance, not “no performance”. Engagements of all kinds have a strategic effect and/or generate some quantity of strategic effectiveness. That is how strategy works.

Unplanned or ill-conducted engagements have always a lot of influence on a general progress, registered on behalf of the object of the conflict. Not only do the tactical and the operational levels of war implement strategy, but even when there is no strategic direction worthy of the name.

This is not to downplay the significance of strategy, but to remember that strategic performance can only rest on tactical performance. “One need not - indeed should not”, endorse all of Clausewitz’s argument to that “only great tactical successes can lead to great strategic ones".

Bibliography

• On War - Carl von Clausewitz;
• Carl von Clausewitz - Enlightenment Philosopher - Amos Perimutter;
• In Quest of the Unknown Clausewitz - Bernard Brodie;
• The Genesis of On War - Peter Paret;
• Clausewitz - in Makers of Modern Strategy - H. Rothfels.